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Abstract
The paper presents a comprehensive review of Vietnam’s foreign investment and exchange rate 
policies. In particular, the paper gives an overview of capital account liberalization in Vietnam 
as it deregulated inward foreign direct investment flows (in December 1987), outward FDI flows 
(in April 1999), and foreign portfolio investment flows (in July1999). It shows that Vietnam, 
by liberalizing the capital account, has attracted a large amount of both FDI and FPI flows 
that appear to have played an important role in subsequent economic development. The paper 
also reviews Vietnam’s exchange rate policy reform as part of banking and financial reform by 
summarizing important changes in the de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements. It also 
shows how the foreign exchange market and the SBV’s intervention operations evolved over the 
period 1990-2010.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The paper presents a review of Vietnam’s foreign investment and exchange rate policies by paying 
particular attention to how the policies evolved over the period of economic renovation (Doi Moi in 
Vietnamese) that began in 1986. Indeed, Doi Moi has transformed the Vietnamese economy from a 
centrally planned to a market-oriented socialist economy and marked a turning point for the social 
and economic development of the communist country. During the period of economic reform, the 
government paid considerable attention to the financial and banking sector because reform in this 
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sector was thought to create a favorable, transparent and sound business environment for enterprises 
and investors. To this end, one of the initial steps in economic reform in general, and in financial and 
banking reform in particular, was to liberalize foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam and to 
make fundamental changes in the roles of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) in forming monetary and 
exchange rate policies, including a shift from a fixed arrangement to a managed float. 
In reviewing Vietnam’s foreign investment and exchange rate policies, the paper gives an overview 
of capital account liberalization as the country deregulated inward foreign direct investment flows (in 
December 1987), outward FDI flows (in April 1999), and foreign portfolio investment flows (in July 
1999). It shows that Vietnam, by liberalizing the capital account, has attracted a large amount of both 
FDI and FPI flows that appear to have played an important role in subsequent economic development. 
The paper also reviews Vietnam’s exchange rate policy reform as an integral part of banking and 
financial reform by summarizing important changes in the de jure and de facto exchange rate 
arrangements. It also shows how the foreign exchange market and the SBV’s intervention operations 
evolved over the period 1990-2010.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a comprehensive review of foreign 
investments in Vietnam including the process of capital account liberalization as well as developments 
in inward FDI, outward FDI and FPI over the period 1990-2010. Section III discusses exchange rate 
policy as implemented by the SBV, with a reference to the banking reform of which it was a part, and 
considers the de jure as well as de facto exchange rate arrangements of Vietnam, with a focus on how 
Vietnam’s foreign exchange market and the SBV’s intervention operations (to stabilize the dong’s US 
dollar exchange rate) evolved over time. Finally, Section IV presents concluding remarks.
II.  FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN VIETNAM, 1990-2010
II.1. Evolution in the legal framework for foreign investment as part of capital account liberali-
zation 
II. 1.1. Liberalizing inward foreign direct investment (inward FDI)
Together with a number of other measures designed to transform Vietnam from central planning 
to market economy, the first Law on Foreign Investment was approved by the National Assembly 
on 29 December 1987. This marked a turning point in the country’s regime toward inward foreign 
investment flows into Vietnam. The law was amended in 1990 and again in 1992 to give more rights 
and incentives to foreign investors, including: (i) equal tax treatment for joint venture and fully 
foreign owned firms; (ii) permission to invest in the construction of infrastructure; and (iii) longer 
duration of business operations. During the period 1988-1996, however, the volume of FDI inflows 
remained small, both in absolute value and as a percentage of GDP, likely owing to (i) limitations 
on the permitted forms of investment; (ii) high tax on the repatriation of income; (iii) and foreign 
exchange controls (e.g., documentary requirements for buying foreign currency).
In order to promote FDI inflows, the National Assembly passed a Law on Foreign Direct Investment 
on 12 November 1996 to replace the 1987 law. The 1996 law, as amended in June 2000, provided tax 
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incentives and greater rights to foreign investors in Vietnam by expanding the scope of investment, 
allowing a change in the form of investment (e.g., from joint venture to fully foreign ownership), 
allowing the opening of new branches beyond the headquarters, simplifying the licensing procedure, 
Table 1 . Successive Investment Laws Related to Inward FDI Flows in Vietnam
Foreign Investment Law (1987) Foreign Direct Investment Law (1996) Investment Law (2006)
Scope Inward foreign investment 
activities in Vietnam
Inward foreign direct investment 
activities in Vietnam
-Domestic investments
-Inward and outward foreign invest-
ment activities 
Forms of 
foreign 
investment
-Business cooperation con-
tracts
-Joint ventures
-100% foreign owned firms
-Business cooperation contracts
-Joint ventures
-100% foreign owned firms;
-Build-Operate-Transfer Build-
Transfer-Operate; and Build-
Transfer 
-Business cooperation contracts
-100% foreign owned firms
-Joint ventures
-Build-Operate-Transfer Build-
Transfer-Operate; and Build-Transfer
-Merger and Acquisition
-Joint stock companies
-Others
Foreign 
ownership
At least 30% with no upper 
limit
At least 30% with no upper limit No requirements specified
Duration of 
business
-No more than 20 years
-No more than 50 years (as 
amended in December 1992)
No more than 50 years; and 70 
years for special cases
No more than 50 years; and 70 years 
for special cases
Investment 
licensing 
procedures
3 months 60 days -Equity capital less than VND300 
billions: 15 days
-Equity capital more than VND300 
billions: 30 days; no more than 45 
days for special cases
Corporate 
income tax 
-Exemption for joint ventures 
(and for 100% foreign owned 
firms after December 1992) 
for a maximum of 2 years 
after posting profits; and 50% 
reduction for up to 2 addi-
tional years
-15-25% depending on the 
invested sectors and forms of 
FDI
-Exemption for FDI firms and 
foreigners in business coopera-
tion contracts for a maximum of 
2 years (4 years for special cases 
and 8 years for exceptional cases) 
after posting profits; and 50% 
reduction for up to 2 additional 
years (4 years for special cases) 
-10-15-20-25% depending on the 
type of sector
-Reduction and exemption of tax sub-
ject to special provisions
-10-15-20-25% depending on the 
type of sector
Repatriation 
of capital 
and income 
Allowed, subject to documen-
tary requirements
-Allowed, subject to documen-
tary requirements
Allowed, subject to documentary 
requirements
Tax on 
repatriation 
of income
5-10% depending on the 
amount of capital invested by 
foreign entities
-5-7-10% depending on the 
amount of capital invested by 
foreign entities
-3-5-7% (as amended in Jun 
2000)
Zero (per Ministry of Finance Cir-
cular 26 /2004/TT-BTC, 13 March 
2004) 
Exchange 
control
Foreign investor allowed to 
buy foreign currency at the 
official exchange rate an-
nounced by the State Bank 
of Vietnam (SBV), subject to 
documentary requirements
Foreign investor allowed to buy 
foreign currency at the official 
exchange rate announced by 
SBV, subject to documentary 
requirement
Foreign investors allowed to buy for-
eign currency at the trading exchange 
rate quoted by any licensed com-
mercial banks in Vietnam, subject to 
documentary requirements
Account 
opening
FDI firms allowed to open 
VND and foreign currency 
denominated accounts at the 
Bank for Foreign Trade or for-
eign bank branches in Vietnam
FDI firms allowed to open VND 
and foreign currency denominat-
ed accounts at any licensed bank 
in Vietnam; or at banks located 
abroad in special cases
FDI firms allowed to open VND 
and foreign currency denominated 
accounts at any licensed bank in 
Vietnam; or at banks located abroad 
in special cases
Sources: Law on Foreign Investment (1987), Law on Foreign Direct Investment (1996), and Investment Law (2006)
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and the like. In general, the revision made in the Law on Foreign Investment during 1988-2008 
aimed to remove obstacles to foreign investment and to create a more favorable environment for 
foreign investors. The government, in making these changes, may have been motivated by: (i) the 
country’s critical need for capital for industrialization and modernization; and (ii) external pressure 
for international economic integration arising from bilateral trade agreements, bilateral investment 
agreements, and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The Law on Investment, approved by the National Assembly on 29 December 2005, took effect 
on 1 July 2006, providing a unified legal framework for both domestic and foreign investments in 
Vietnam. According to this law, foreign investment flows were for the first time classified as either 
foreign direct investment or foreign indirect investment (see Table 1on how this law compares with 
the previous investment laws).
　II.1.2. Liberalizing outward foreign direct investment (outward FDI)
A country typically engages in two-way capital flows, with Vietnam being no exception. Before 
1999, against the background of substantial FDI inflows, Vietnamese enterprises had carried out 
outward FDI projects in neighboring countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, even though the existing 
law only focused on inward FDI. In order to establish a legal framework for Vietnam’s enterprises 
to invest abroad, on 4 April 1999, the government approved Decree 22/1999 to guide and manage 
outward FDI flows. At the same time, some legal measures were taken by the SBV (regarding 
foreign exchange management with respect to outward FDI projects) and by the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment (related to guidelines and practices for FDI outflows), which were all designed 
to assist Vietnamese enterprises with doing business abroad. Even so, outward FDI investors still 
faced difficulties and obstacles in implementing projects, including the cumbersome administrative 
procedures, and the lack of consistent and transparent rules. 
In order to create a more favorable investment environment for outward foreign direct investors 
and to maintain the process of capital account liberalization, the government created a framework for 
outward FDI activities by approving the Investment Law (2006). As noted previously, this was made 
to apply to both inward and outward FDI, as well as to foreign portfolio investment. The general 
provisions of the Investment Law (2006) were made more specific by Decree 78 (2006), which gave 
comprehensive guidelines for Vietnamese enterprises investing abroad. Legally at least, this was an 
important milestone in the process of capital account liberalization in Vietnam (see Table 2 on how the 
2006 measures compare with the previous law on outward FDI).
　II.1.3. Liberalizing foreign portfolio investments (FPI)
The initial step in liberalizing foreign portfolio investment was the Vietnamese government’s 
approval of Decision 145/1999 and Circular 132/1999 on the sale of stocks to foreign investors. These 
measures set preconditions for the establishment of the Hochiminh Stock Exchange in July 2000, but 
given the strict rules, the cumbersome administration procedure,1 and the limited number of listed 
securities, they helped attract little foreign investment into the Vietnamese stock market. In view of 
1 Decision 145/1999 and Circular 132/1999 stated that foreign investors could re-sell or transfer stocks after one year if 
they did not take part in managing the company or after three years if they did so
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Table 2 . Successive Investment Laws and Other Legal Measures Related to Outward FDI in Vietnam
Decree 22 (April 1999) Decree 78 (August 2006)
Scope Outward foreign direct investments -Detailed guidelines for outward FDI only 
based on the general provisions of the Invest-
ment Law (2006)
Sectors for which 
incentives are given 
for outward foreign 
direct investment
All sectors, except banking, insurance and 
finance
All sectors, except special sectors listed by the 
government
Eligible investors -State-owned enterprises
-Cooperatives
-Private enterprises, joint-stock enterprises 
-State-owned enterprises
-Cooperatives
-Private enterprises, joint-stock enterprises, 
limited companies
-FDI-related enterprises
-Profit-based organizations related to health 
care, education, science, culture, and sports
-Vietnamese households and individuals
Eligible sectors All sectors, except banking, insurance and finan-
cial, press and media, and telecommunication
All sectors
Approving authority -Prime Minister for outward investment pro-
jects of enterprises established by the govern-
ment (usually state-owned enterprises) and 
those with more than US$1 million of equity 
capital
-Ministry of Planning and Investment for all 
others
-Prime Minister for outward investment pro-
jects in banking, insurance and financial, press 
and media, and telecommunication enterprises 
in which the government owns more than 
VND150 billion of equity capital(equivalent to 
US$10 million based on the exchange rate at 
the time of approval) and those in all other sec-
tors with more than VND300 billion in equity 
capital (equivalent to US$20 million based on 
the exchange rate at the time of approval)
-Ministry of Planning and Investment for all others
Investment licensing 
procedures
-No more than 30 days -No more than 30 days 
Repatriation of in-
come 
Must be repatriated within 6 months from the 
end of each fiscal year in the host country; other 
special cases must be reported to the SBV
Must be repatriated within 6 months from the 
end of each fiscal year in the host country; other 
special cases must be reported to the SBV
Foreign exchange 
control
-Subject to the existing foreign exchange 
controls
-No requirements specified on opening domes-
tic bank accounts
Outward FDI investors must open an account 
at a Vietnamese commercial bank; capital 
must be disbursed abroad through that account 
and subject to foreign exchange regulations 
Sources: Decree 22 (1999) on outward FDI flows, and Decree 78 (2006) on outward FDI flows
Figure 1 . Capital Account Liberalization in Vietnam
Step 1: Liberalizing inward foreign direct investment
-Foreign Investment Law (1987)
-Foreign Direct Investment Law (1996)
-The Investment Law (2006)
Step 2: Liberalizing outward foreign direct investment
-Decree 22 on outward direct investment (1999)
-Investment Law (2006) and Decree 78 (2006)
Step 3: Liberalizing foreign portfolio investment
-Decision 145 and Circular 132 on the sale of stocks to foreign investors (1999)
-Investment Law (2006) and Decision 88 (2009)
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this, the National Assembly approved the unified Investment Law 2006 as previously noted. A legal 
framework was thus established for foreign portfolio investment activities.
According to the Investment Law (2006), FPI is defined as “an investment through the purchase of 
stocks, bonds and other financial assets or through investment funds and other financial intermediates 
that are not involved in the management of the invested firms.” In addition, the authorities introduced 
legal measures to create a favorable background for the further development of Vietnam’s stock 
market, including: raising the limit on foreign ownership in Vietnam’s enterprises, and eliminating 
foreign exchange controls on foreign investments. As a result, foreign investors were allowed to own 
as much as 49 percent (raised from 30 percent) of equity in listed companies (except in the banking 
and financial sector) from September 2005 and from June 2009 in unlisted companies. Thus, Vietnam 
now has a well-established legal framework for all types of foreign investment flows (Figure 1).
II.2. Recent developments in foreign investment flows
II.2.1. Inward FDI flows, 1991-2010
Cyclicality was observed in the volume of FDI flows into Vietnam for the period 1991-2010 (Figure 
2). In the first half of the 1990s, FDI disbursements increased rapidly, from US$328.8 million in 
1991 to US$1,956 million in 1995, and reached the peak of US$2,395 million in 1996. Following the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, disbursements gradually declined to reach US$1,298 million in 
2000. The subsequent revival of FDI can be attributed to the strong recovery of other Asian countries 
from the crisis as well as to the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement between Vietnam and the 
United States. The increase in FDI disbursements after 2006 was dramatic indeed: from US$2,400 
million in 2006 to US$6,700 million in 2007, and to a record US$9,579 million in 2008 even amid the 
global economic crisis. The increase may have resulted from the country’s accession to the WTO at 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam; Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment; author’s calculations
Figure 2 . Developments in Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Vietnam, 1991-2010 (in millions of US 
dollars; in percent of GDP)
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Table 3 . Successive Investment Laws and Other Legal Measures Related to FPI in Vietnam
Decision 145 and Circular 132 (1999) Investment Law (2006) and Decision 88 (2009)
Scope Selling stocks to foreign investors -Domestic investments
-Inward and outward foreign direct investment 
activities
-Foreign portfolio investment
Forms of foreign 
investment
No definition specified -Through the purchase of stocks, bonds and 
other financial assets, with no involvement in 
management of invested enterprises
-Through investment funds
-Through other financial intermediaries
Eligible foreign 
investors 
-Foreign institutions 
-Foreign individuals
-Oversea Vietnamese
-Foreign institutions, and its branches in Vietnam 
and foreign countries
-Foreign investment related enterprises in which 
foreign ownership is more than 49 percent of 
equity capital
-Investment funds, and investment companies in 
which foreign ownership is more than 49 percent 
of equity capital
-Foreign individuals 
Foreign ownership -Limited to 30 percent in sectors related to 
agriculture, forestry, manufacturing, hotels, 
restaurants, tourism, transportation, health 
care, education, science, and technology
-For listed joint stock company: no more than 
30 percent of equity capital, with maximum for 
a single individual, institutional and a single 
strategic institutional entity of 5 percent, 10 
percent, 15 percent, respectively, in the case of 
the banking sector; no more than 49 percent in all 
other cases
-For unlisted joint stock company: no more than 
30 percent, with maximum for a single individual, 
institutional and a single strategic institutional 
entity is 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 
respectively, in the case of the banking sector; 30 
percent, to be raised to 49 percent from 1st June 
2009 (Decision 55/2009), in all other cases
Rights to resell or 
transfer stocks
After 1 year if they do not take part in 
managing the companies; otherwise, after 3 
years
No requirements specified
Repatriation of 
capital and income 
-Foreign investors are allowed to repatriate 
their capital after 1 year
-Foreign investors are allowed to repatriate 
their income subject to documentary 
requirements after completing tax and other 
financial responsibility
Allowed, subject to documentary requirements 
after completing tax and other financial 
responsibility
Exchange control Foreign investors are allowed to convert 
their income in dong into foreign 
currencies at any licensed commercial 
bank in Vietnam, subject to documentary 
requirements
Foreign investors are allowed to convert their 
income in dong into foreign currencies at any 
licensed commercial bank in Vietnam, subject to 
documentary requirements
Account opening Foreign investors are allowed to open VND 
and foreign currency denominated accounts 
at any licensed bank in Vietnam; all 
transactions including buying and selling 
stocks, receiving and using dividends, 
repatriation of capital and income, and 
any other related to investment activities 
in Vietnamese enterprises must be made 
through these accounts
Foreign investors are allowed to open VND 
and foreign currency denominated accounts at 
any licensed bank in Vietnam; all transactions 
including buying and selling stocks, receiving and 
using dividends, repatriation of capital and income, 
and any other related to investment activities in 
Vietnamese enterprises must be made through 
these accounts
Sources: Decision 145 and Circular 132 (1999) on the sale of stocks to foreign investors, Investment Law (2006) and 
Decision 88 (2009)
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the beginning of 2007. However, realized FDI inflows declined to US$ 7,600 million in 2009 against 
the background of global and domestic turbulences, though they picked up moderately to US$8,000 
million in 2010. 
Concurrent with these changes in the volume of FDI inflows, there was also a significant change in 
the composition of FDI projects by economic sector in Vietnam (Table 4). Oil and gas, agriculture and 
forestry, and services were the three most targeted sectors during the first stage of Doi Moi (1988-1990), 
and each of these sectors accounted for one fourth to one third of total FDI commitments. In later 
years, however, heavy industries and construction as well as real estate assumed greater importance as 
the sectors most attractive to foreign investors. It is apparent that labor-intensive sectors, such as light 
industry (including food processing), agriculture and forestry, have attracted only a small share of the 
FDI projects.
Table 4 . Foreign Direct Investment by Economic Sector, 1988-2008 (in percent of total)
1988-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Oil and Gas 27.2 5.8 12.8 0.8 14.6
Heavy industries and construction 4.4 26.4 26.0 38.3 33.2
Light industry (e.g., food processing) 8.0 15.6 11.8 25.7 6.8
Agriculture and forestry 24.7 8.3 4.7 8.8 0.8
Real estate 0.8 19.4 23.7 11.2 24.7
Services 34.7 24.4 21.0 15.2 19.9
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam; Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment; author’s calculations
Table 5 . Foreign Direct Investment by Form of Investment, 1988 -2007 (in millions of US dollars; in 
percent of total)
1988-1990 1991-1996 1997-2001 2002-2007
Amount (in millions of US dollars)
Total 1412.7 20317 15911 45546
Joint ventures 927 14078 5162 4408
100% foreign owned projects 35 4670 7709 40023
Business cooperation contracts 450.7 1569 1662 527
Build-Operate-Transfer, Build-Transfer-Operate, and 
Build-Transfer - - 1228 483
Joint stock and shareholding companies - - 150 105
Composition (in percent)
Total 100 100 100 100
Joint ventures 65.6 69.3 32.4 9.7 
100% foreign owned projects 2.5 23.0 48.5 87.9 
Business cooperation contracts 31.9 7.7 10.4 1.2 
Build-Operate-Transfer, Build-Transfer-Operate, and 
Build-Transfer 0.0 0.0 7.7 1.1 
Joint stock and shareholding companies - - 0.9 0.2 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam; Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment; author’s calculations
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Importantly, joint ventures constituted a significant majority of total FDI inflows into Vietnam in 
the early years (Table 5). Especially during 1988-1990 and 1991-1996, the joint-venture form of FDI 
accounted for nearly two thirds of total inflows. This reflects the fact that, during the period 1988-
1996 when the initial Law on Foreign Investment was in force, the government favored joint-venture 
firms more than fully foreign owned ones by giving lower taxes, preferential credit, access to a greater 
number of sectors, and more simplified administrative procedures. After 1996, however, the share of 
joint ventures in total FDI commitments declined dramatically (e.g., only 10 percent during 2002-
2007). An opposite trend was observed for fully foreign owned investments. Whereas their share 
in total FDI commitments was only 2.5 percent in the first stage of Doi Moi, it rose significantly to 
become the dominant form of FDI, with 88 percent during 2002-2007. Finally, investments under 
the so-called Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), and Build-Transfer 
(BT) schemes, first introduced by the 1996 law, accounted for 7.7 percent and 1.1 percent of total 
FDI commitments, respectively, during 1997-2001 and 2002-2007. These forms of investment are 
concentrated in such highly protected industries as mining and petroleum (Tran, 2009).
II.2.2. Outward FDI flows, 1991-2010
Before the approval of Decree 22/1999 on FDI outflows (1990-1998), there were 18 outward FDI 
projects with the total registered capital of US$13.6 million (Table 6). At that time, all projects carried 
out by enterprises in provinces that share borders with Laos and Cambodia were based on bilateral 
cooperation agreements at the provincial level. After Decree 22/1999 took effect, FDI outflows 
increased dramatically in terms of the number of projects (from 18 during 1990-1998 to 131 during 
1999-2005) as well as in terms of registered capital (from US$13.6 million to US$559.89 million). But 
FDI outflows increased even more rapidly follows the passage of the Investment Law (2006): from 36 
projects with US$425.29 million in 2006 to a record of 113 projects with US$3 billion in 2008. After 
a global crisis-related decline in 2009, Vietnamese FDI investors invested US$2.926 billion abroad in 
terms of registered capital in 2010.The significant increase of FDI outflows in recent years, especially 
after the Investment Law of 2006 and Vietnam’s WTO accession in 2007, indicates that Vietnam has 
been gradually integrating into the global financial market.
Table 6 . Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, 1990-2010
Year Number of newlyregistered projects
Registered capital
 (in millions of US dollars)
Implemented capital
 (in millions of US dollars)
1990-1998 18 13.6 927 
1999-2005 131 559.89
2006 36 425.29
2007 64 391.2 
2008 113 3,000 400 
2009 89 2,458 n/a
2010 107 2,926 900 
Source: Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment
⎫
⎜
⎜
⎬
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⎭
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II.2.3. Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) flows, 1991-2010
　II.2.3.a. The performance of foreign investment funds in Vietnam　
1990-1997: Following the approval of the Foreign Investment Law in 1987, the program of 
“comprehensively open economic policies and privatization” (Co Phan Hoa in Vietnamese) launched 
in 1992 initially attracted FPI flows through eight foreign investment funds (Table 7). During the 
period 1990-1997, however, the average volume of FPI flows accounted for only 5.58 percent of 
disbursed FDI and only 0.37 percent of GDP. This poor performance can be explained by several 
factors. First, the Hochiminh Stock Exchange (HOSE) was not established until 1997. Second, the 
government moved only slowly to privatize state-owned enterprises beginning with small and medium 
sized firms and profitable or at least potentially profitable firms; large and strategic firms were initially 
excluded from privatization (Truong et al, 2007). Thus, foreign funds could invest only in a handful 
of privatized firms with a relatively small capital (Table 7). Third, the further opening measures which 
foreign investors had anticipated to be taken following the normalization of diplomatic ties between 
Vietnam and the US in 1995 did not happen. As a result, three of the eight investment funds moved 
out of Vietnam at the end of 1997.
1998-2002: This was a period of stagnation. Like most other Asian countries, Vietnam was 
adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis and saw a fall in the volume of FDI and FPI inflows. 
The Vietnam Enterprise Fund (established in Vietnam, July 1995), with a capital of US$35 million, 
was the only investment fund that maintained trading activities at a minimum level in Vietnam. 
Several factors explain the decline in foreign capital inflows:
(i) Concerns about the Asian financial crisis caused most foreign investors to withdraw from Asia, 
including Vietnam;
(ii) With critical remarks about the role of short-term speculative flows in precipitating the Asian 
financial crisis, the government took a cautious attitude toward FPI. In 1999, it encouraged FDI by 
2 The value of privatized capital in US dollars was obtained from dividing the dong figure by the average end-year 
exchange rate.
Table 7 . Number of New Foreign Investment Funds and Newly Privatized Firms, 1991-1997
Year
No. of 
investment 
funds
Capital (in 
millions of 
US dollars
No. of 
privatized 
firms
Privatized capital
(in millions of)
Ownership structure (%)
VND USD2 State Employees Outsiders
1991 1 60 0 - - - - -
1992 0 - 0 - - - - -
1993 0 - 2 22,200 2.048 26.6 57.54 15.82
1994 4 270 1 4,793 0.436 30 35.2 34.8
1995 2 76.5 2 11,452 1.039 30.1 49.57 20.37
1996 0 - 6 19,032 1.724 n/a n/a n/a
1997 1 11.1 4 55,800 4.993 n/a n/a n.a
Total 8 417.6 15 113,277 10.240 n/a n/a n/a
Sources: Truong et al (2007), Nguyen (2007), and author’s calculations
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offering incentives, but they did not apply to FPI;
(iii) Despite the establishment of the HOSE in July 2000, the number of listed stocks remained 
small and the stock market remained unattractive to foreign investors (Table 9); and
(iv) From mid-1998 to 2001, the privatization process moved more vigorously with 937 firms 
privatized, but only a small number of stocks were sold to outsiders including foreign investors 
(approximately 25 percent of privatized capital). Moreover, large and strategic firms in the banking, 
telecommunications, petro and aviation sectors were still held by the government.
2002-2007: This was is a period of “boom,” especially from 2006. The privatization process was 
accelerated when the government allowed some large and “monopoly” firms in the banking, petro, and 
telecommunication sectors to be privatized in 2006. With accession to the WTO in January 2007, the 
government took steps to liberate markets in order to fulfill its commitments. In late 2006 and early 
2007, against the background of strong economic performance, macroeconomic stability and a stock 
market boom, Vietnam became an attractive destination for both individual and institutional foreign 
investors, so that the number of foreign investment funds and fund management companies investing 
in Vietnam rose significantly (Table 8).
2008-2010: During this period Vietnam suffered from the negative effects of the global financial 
3 These numbers are based on foreign investors’ trading in listed stocks and bonds in HOSE and HASTC. Foreign 
investors’ trading volume and value in unlisted stocks are not available.
4 Net value in US dollars is obtained from dividing the net value in dong by the end-year exchange rate.
Table 9 . Transactions by Foreign Investors in Vietnam’s Stock Market
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
No. of listed stocks
VN Index
2
206.8
3
235.4
17
183.3
22
166.9
26
239.3
32
307.5
108
751.8
253
927.02
342
315.6
No. of foreign investors’ 
accounts of which:
Institutions
Individuals
24
3
21
45
10
35
72
18
54
98
18
80
203
25
178
427
38
389
1700
82
1618
8140
n/a
n/a
10000
n/a
n/a
Net trading value (in billions of 
Vietnamese dong)3
0 14.5 146.9 252.7 463.7 202 7600 26153 6348
Net trading value (in millions 
of US dollars)4
0 0.96 9.56 16.2 29.47 12.72 472.3 1623 373.9
Percent of disbursed FDI 0 0.07 0.68 1.12 1.83 0.65 19.68 24.22 4.79
Percent of GDP 0 0.003 0.027 0.04 0.065 0.024 0.78 2.29 0.43
Sources: State Securities Commission of Vietnam, HOSE, HASTC, and author’s calculations
Table 8 . Number of Foreign Investment Funds and Privatized Firms, 2002-2008
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
No. of newly privatized firms 164 537 753 687 717 116 74 n/a
No. of foreign investment 
funds
3 5 7 11 23 30 n/a n/a
No. of fund management co. 0 0 1 6 19 25 42 n/a
Sources: State Securities Commission of Vietnam, Truong (2007), Hoang (2008)
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crisis and domestic economic turbulences. Equity prices had tumbled by nearly 70 percent from Janu-
ary to December 2008, creating large losses for foreign investment funds, and caused some invest-
ment funds to withdraw from Vietnam. Although the country received a record US$ 6.5 billion in FPI 
inflows in 2007, there was a reversal of US$ 2 billion in 2008 and US$ 230 million in 2009 (Figure 3). 
This was followed by a renewed pick-up in 2010 as Vietnam’s economy recovered and stock prices 
edged up.
　II.2.3.b. Transactionsby foreign investors in the Vietnamese stock market
The establishment of HOSE (July 2000) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HASTC, March 2005) 
were important events that marked the further integration of Vietnam into the international financial 
world. Given the well-established legal framework and a more extensive program of privatization in 
the banking, aviation and petro fields led to a stock market boom after 2006. The number of listed 
stocks increased significantly from 32 in 2005 to 108 in 2006, and further to 668 at the end of 2010.
For the bond market, Moody’s raised its rating of Vietnam’s foreign-currency government bonds 
from B1 to Ba3 in July 2005; Fitch Ratings rated them at BB-. In October 2005, Vietnam successfully 
floated its first sovereign bonds with a 10-year maturity at 6.875 percent in the international market to 
raise US$750 million. Vietnam’s domestic currency government bonds also attracted foreign investors 
because of high interest rates and the dong’s exchange rate stability relative to the US dollar. 275 
issues of government bonds with a maturity of more than 6 months were transferred from HOSE to 
HASTC and a market solely dedicated to the trading of bonds was formally established for the first 
time at HASTC in June 2008. As of 8 April 2011, 510 issues of government bonds were listed and 
traded at HASTC, with a total value of VND169.173 trillion (equivalent to US$8.05 billion).5
5 Website of the Hanoi Stock Exchange: http://www.hnx.vn.
Source: State Bank of Vietnam
Figure 3 . Foreign Portfolio Investment Inflows in Vietnam, 2001-2010 (in millions of US dollars)
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III.  EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, 1990-2010
III.1. Monetary policy as background to exchange rate policy, 1990-2010
III.1.1. Banking sector reform, 1990-2010
As part of the program of economic renovation (Doi Moi) from1986, Vietnam reformed the financial 
and banking sector by establishing a two-tier banking system in 1988 under which the State Bank of 
Vietnam (as the central bank) was separated from four state-owned commercial banks. Until 1990, all 
banking services were provided within a centralized plan, however, so that the banking system was 
heavily regulated, largely ineffective and characterized by a lack of technological modernization and 
innovation (Jarvis, 2002). Moreover, the two-tier banking system did not function as expected because 
the SBV was still a part of the state bureaucracy. In order to create a more favorable legal environment 
for financial and banking activities in Vietnam, therefore, the government issued an ordinance on the 
SBV and an ordinance on banks, credit co-operative and finance companies in May 1990. Regulations 
by the SBV remained inadequate; however, and a rapid credit expansion ensued among ill-managed 
and ill-capitalized financial institutions. This led to a massive collapse of credit cooperatives, which 
harmed public confidence in Vietnam’s banking system.
In order to overcome these difficulties, the National Assembly approved the State Bank of Vietnam 
Law and the Credit Institutions Law in December 1997, both of which came into effect in October 
1998. In May 2005, moreover, the government made a decision to restructure the state-owned 
commercial banks, and convert them into joint-stock companies by 2010. This was expected to lead 
to a significant increase in the number and types of financial intermediaries, especially as wholly 
foreign-owned banks were permitted to enter the market under the WTO commitments. By December 
2010, therefore, Vietnam’s banking system had consisted of four state-owned commercial banks (two 
of which were privatized in 2009 with majority shares held by the government), a social policy bank, 
37 joint-stock commercial banks, 48 branches of foreign banks, five joint-venture banks, five wholly 
foreign-owned banks, 17 finance companies, 13 financial leasing companies, 48 representative offices 
of foreign banks, a microfinance institution, and a system of 1057 credit funds.6
Although the banking system has played an important role in Vietnam’s economic development, 
the legacy of central planning remains. The SBV is legally defined as one of the “ministries” of the 
government and pursues objectives assigned by the government.7 Unlike most foreign central banks, 
the SBV is dependent on the government so that it does not enjoy the reputation required to anchor 
inflationary expectations. The commercial bank system on its part is yet to establish itself on a firm 
prudential foundation. At present, it has weaknesses in several areas.
First, although the capital adequacy of Vietnamese commercial banks meets the international 
standard of 8 percent, it is still lower than the regional average of 13.1 percent for Asia and the Pacific 
6 www.sbv.gov.vn.
7 For political reasons, the government may set economic objectives that come in conflict with each other, such as high 
economic growth and low inflation; high credit growth and low inflation; exchange rate stability, monetary policy 
independence and gradual capital account liberalization, etc. These complicate the mission for the SBV.   
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and 12.3 percent for East Asia (Leung, 2009). Moreover, the size of commercial banks (in terms of 
equity) is still relatively small in comparison with other banks in Asia (the largest commercial bank 
in Vietnam has only about US$650 million in equity). With a weak financial capacity, Vietnamese 
commercial banks have difficulty in competing with foreign banks even in the domestic market.
Second, there is a large difference in equity size between state-owned banks (with an average of 
US$600 million) and joint-stock banks (US$100 million). As depositors prefer larger banks, smaller 
banks have a tendency to attract deposits by offering higher rates. At the time of a financial crisis, this 
has created fierce interest rate competition because larger banks also raised their deposit rates. The 
SBV has imposed a ceiling on deposit rates, but this has led to a distortion in the allocation of funds.
Third, financial services are not well diversified, with provision of credit remaining the main activity 
of commercial banks (e.g., turnover on credit operations accounts for 50-60 percent of gross turnover 
in commercial banks). In addition, non-performing loans in Vietnam’s commercial banks are sizable 
(about 5 percent) in comparison with the average (2 percent) of commercial banks in foreign countries 
(Leung, 2009). Finally, management skills, especially liabilities and risk management skills, are still 
weak. Commercial banks tend to manage mostly short-term funds as long-term assets, creating a 
serious maturity mismatch and liquidity risk (Le, 2007). 
III.1.2. Monetary policy goals and instruments
Vietnam has experienced a higher rate of inflation than most other Asian economies (Figure 4), with 
the result that the domestic currency tended to depreciate overtime. Thus, the primary objective of 
monetary policy during 1990-2010 was to control inflation and stabilize the exchange rate. Monetary 
policy was also directed toward stabilizing macroeconomic conditions and ensuring social welfare, 
especially during financial crises. In order to achieve these objectives, the SBV has used a variety of 
instruments, including credit limits (until 2005), reserve requirements, open market operations (from 
July 2000), interest rate instruments (the base interest rate, discount rate, and financing rate), and the 
Sources: www.gso.gov.vn; www.adb.org
Figure 4 . Inflation Rates in Selected Asian Countries (in percent per year)
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official exchange rate, which are used as an indirect instrument and even a target in some cases.
1990-1996: Vietnam experienced severe economic difficulties during this period, such as rapid 
inflation,8 large balance of payment deficits, and a series of credit cooperative failures. In order to 
create a favorable legal environment for the operations of the central bank, the government approved 
the Ordinance on the State Bank of Vietnam in which the term “monetary policy” was formally used 
for the first time. Although the SBV at the time was still following the old operating mechanism, the 
law clarified the objective of monetary management as that of stabilizing prices and the exchange rate. 
1997-1999: Because of the negative effects of the Asian financial crisis, the SBV initially followed a 
contractionary monetary policy for controlling inflation, increasing the level of international reserves, 
and stabilizing the exchange rate. In 1999, the SBV shifted to a “carefully” expansionary policy 
stance as the country was about to experience deflation. The term “carefully” means that the SBV 
implemented an expansionary policy but they paid close attention on the movement of prices in order 
to keep inflation at a moderate level. 
2000-2005: As the country came under deflationary pressure with low economic growth from mid-
1999, the SBV followed a moderately expansionary policy stance. However, during 2000-2003, credit 
growth was targeted at 21-22 percent per year, but only 68 percent of the target was achieved in spite 
of a cut in interest rates. Because Vietnamese economic growth is critically driven by investment, 
of which domestic credit is an important determinant, this may in part explain the generally low 
economic growth during that time. In addition, domestic and global disturbances, such as a sharp spike 
in oil prices, the bird flu epidemic, and several natural disasters, may have been negative influences 
on economic growth in 2004 and 2005. Under these circumstances, the SBV continued to pursue an 
expansionary policy with the primary objectives of controlling prices while accelerating economic 
growth.
2006-2010: Accession to the WTO in 2007 created favorable conditions for the economic 
development of Vietnam. Moreover, a legal framework was gradually established for cross-border 
capital flows, with the Ordinance on Foreign Exchange (2006) and the Investment Law (2006). The 
global financial crisis and domestic disturbances, however, led to a deceleration of growth during 
2007-2009.9 Thus, the SBV switched between contractionary and expansionary policies, depending on 
the prevailing economic condition during this period. 
III.2. De jure versus de facto exchange rate regimes in Vietnam
Until 1991, Vietnam, like any other communist country, participated in the internal market of goods 
and commodities among the socialist countries at soft prices set in term of the rouble. The Soviet 
Union had been Vietnam's main trading partner for many years. With non-convertible currencies, 
compensation trade was the dominant form, in which Vietnam relied heavily on the Soviet Union 
for many of its strategic imports (Brahm and Le, 1993). Under this system, the exchange rate was 
determined by comparing the internal and the external purchasing power of currencies and set by 
multi-party agreements among communist countries. In retrospect, the dong was overvalued during 
8 Inflation was 34.7 percent in 1989, 67.1 percent in 1990, and 67.5 percent in 1991.
9 See Takagi and Pham (2011) for more details.
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this period, so that Vietnam had large chronic trade deficits. In the process of economic transition, in 
1991, the Vietnamese authorities shifted the country’s exchange rate arrangement to a more flexible 
arrangement, though the official rate was kept stable at around 11,000 per US dollar with a narrow 
trading band ranging between ±0.1 to ±1% during 1991-1997. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 caused the currencies of many Asian countries to depreciate 
against the US dollar, which meant that the dong, still pegged to the US dollar, severely became 
overvalued against other Asian currencies. In order to improve competitiveness and thereby overcome 
its economic difficulties caused by the crisis, the Vietnamese monetary authorities switched to 
an exchange rate policy in which it combines strict foreign exchange controls and gradual dong 
depreciation.
Since 25 February 1999, the SBV has followed the practice of announcing on each working day an 
official US dollar exchange rate of the dong, along with a trading band, on the basis of the average 
Table 10 . Chronology of Vietnam’s De Jure and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes, 1990-2010
Time De jure exchange 
rate regime
De facto exchange 
rate regime
Details
Before 1990 A fixed exchange 
rate regime
A fixed exchange 
rate regime
-Multiple exchange rates consisting of the official 
or trade exchange rate, non-trade exchange rate, 
internal settlement rate, and parallel market 
exchange rate
-Exchange rates were unified in 1989 as the official 
exchange rate; the SBV devalued the official rate to 
be in line with the parallel rate: 1USD=4,500VND, 
with a margin of ±5%
1991-1996 A managed float A simple US dollar 
peg
- The official exchange rate was around 11,000, 
with a margin of +0,1% (7/1994), ±0,5% (10/1994); 
and ±1% (11/1996).
1997-24 February
1999
A managed float A pegged exchange 
rate regime with a 
horizontal band
- The trading bands were widened to ±5% (February 
1997); ±10% (October 1997); +10% (January 
1998); and +7% (August 1998)
- The official exchange rate was devalued 4 times: 
5.23% (February 1998); 3.92% (August 1998); 5.3% 
(December 1998); and 6.51% (26 February 1999)
25 February 
1999-2004
A managed float Managed floating 
with no pre-
determined path for 
the exchange rate
- The official exchange rate was devalued by 6.51% 
on 26 February 1999, with a one-sided margin of 
+0.1%
-Margin was widened to ±0.25% in July 2002
2005-2007 A managed float 
exchange rate regime 
based on a basket of 
currencies
Other conventional 
fixed peg exchange 
rate regime
-Margin was widened to ±0.5% (January 2007) and 
to ±0.75% (December 2007)
- At the begining of each year, the SBV Governor 
announced a targeted change in the exchange rate of 
the dong over the forthcoming year
2008-2010 A managed float 
based on a basket of 
currencies
A simple US dollar 
peg 1
- The official rate was devalued 5 times: 2% (11 
June 2008); 2.9% (25 December 2008); 5.16% (25 
November 2009); 3.25% (11 February 2010); 2.05% 
(18 August 2010); and 8.5% (11 February 2011)
-Margin was changed 6 times: ±1% (10 March 
2008); ±2% (27 June 2008); ±3% (7 November 
2008); ±5% (25 March 2009); ±3% (26 November 
2009); and ±1% (11 February 2011)
Note: See Takagi and Pham (2011) for more details.
Sources: www.sbv.gov.vn, and www.imf.org
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actual exchange rates of preceding days in the inter-bank market. Over the period 1990-2010, the 
de jure exchange rate regime differed from the de facto regime as determined by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Table 10).    
III. 3. Overview of Vietnam’s foreign exchange market
III.3.1. Evolution of Vietnam’s foreign exchange market
　III.3.1.a. Before 1991
As noted previously, in 1988, Vietnam’s banking system was separated into two tiers: the State 
Bank of Vietnam (SBV) and four state-owned commercial banks, including the Bank for Agricultural 
and Rural development (Agribank), the Industrial and Commercial Bank (Vietinbank), the Bank for 
Investment and Development (BIDV), and the Foreign Trade Bank (Vietcombank). As clearly implied 
by their names, the main activities of these state-owned commercial banks were concentrated in a 
particular economic sphere. Vietcombank is a unique bank having a license to operate in international 
banking, foreign exchange transactions, international settlement, and money transfers with foreign 
entities. Limiting the number of commercial banks operating in foreign exchange transactions explains 
why the foreign exchange market remained underdeveloped. Thus, Decree 161/HDBT on “Regulations 
in Foreign Exchange Management” was approved on 18 October 1988 in order to allow all state-
owned commercial banks to do business in foreign exchange and international banking, and thereby 
removed the monopoly role of Vietcombank in this area. 
　III.3.1.b.1991-1994
Faced with a need to balance the demand for and supply of hard currencies as Vietnam began its 
transition to market economy, the government established Foreign Exchange Transaction Centres 
(FETCs) in Hanoi and Hochiminh City on 16 August 1991. The main objectives of the FETCs were:
・ Functioning as an organized market in which buyers and sellers could meet to strike deals with 
each other;
・ Enabling the SBV to monitor supply and demand conditions and to form policies with regard to 
the management of monetary policy as well as foreign exchange reserves;
・Fixing realistic official exchange rates based on the actual market transactions; and
・ Establishing the base from which a fully organized foreign exchange market could develop, with 
spot and forward quotes in all major currencies.
At that time, the FETCs only traded the dong against the US dollar and were managed by a board of 
managers consisting of representatives from the SBV and the four state-owned commercial banks with 
a foreign exchange license. The trading volume in the two centres, however, only remained small and 
accounted for about 10 percent of the total volume traded through the banking system. (Figure 5)
　III.3.1.c.1994-2010
The remarkable economic achievements from the 1986 reform required a further development of 
Vietnam’s foreign exchange market. On 20 October 1994, the SBV established an inter-bank foreign 
exchange market, initially with 24 members. Although it was expected to contribute to improving 
international trade as well as foreign investments between Vietnam and the rest of the world, the 
interbank market had only a modest role to play for the following reasons:    
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・ Demand for US dollars always exceeded the supply, so the dong tended to depreciate against the 
US dollar over time.
・ Although trading between the dong and other foreign currencies was permitted in the market, the 
majority of transactions (more 90percent) were between the dong and the US dollar. 
・ Spot transactions dominated the market with 95 percent of total trading volume, while the trading 
of forwards, swaps and options was relatively small, in part owing to the lack of familiarity with 
hedging on the part of market participants.
・ The proportion of trading volume in the inter-bank foreign exchange market was small relative 
to trading in the over-the-counter (OTC) market (Figure 6), whereas interbank trading is much 
more important in the world’s major markets. This implies that most foreign exchange trading in 
Vietnam was driven by direct trading with companies and individuals.
Sources: Annual Report of State Bank of Vietnam, annual issues
Figure 5 . Trading Volume in FETCs, 1991-1994(in thousands of US dollars) 
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Figure 6 . Trading Volume in the OTC and Inter-bank Markets (in percent of total)
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III.3.2. Intervention in Vietnam’s foreign exchange market: sterilized or non-sterilized?
　III.3.2.a. 1990-1999
From 1992 to early 1998, the SBV attempted to maintain a stable official rate, which fluctuated 
narrowly around 11,000 dong to a dollar, in spite of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. However, 
while other Asian currencies depreciated signifi cantly against the US dollar, the dong remained fairly 
stable, which led to a decline in the competitiveness of Vietnam’s exports. At the same time, there was 
depreciation pressure on the dong, given the continuing current account defi cits, a fall in FDI infl ows, 
and inadequate foreign exchange reserves. To overcome these diffi culties, the SBV gradually allowed 
the dong to depreciate while keeping strict foreign exchange controls.10 In fact, the SBV devalued 
the offi cial rate four times (Figure 7): (1) February 1998 (by 5.23 percent); (2) August 1998 (by 3.92 
percent); (3) December 1998 (by 5.3 percent); and February 1999 (by 6.51 percent). 
Sterilized intervention involves a change in the relative stocks of foreign and domestic assets held 
by the public, unaccompanied by any change in the monetary base. It is the standard practice of many 
central banks to sterilize the effect of foreign exchange market intervention though the use of open-
market operations (OMO) in order to divorce foreign exchange from monetary operations. Because an 
open market did not exist until July 2000,11 the SBV could not perform sterilized intervention during 
the 1990s by using the conventional method. Even so, the SBV paid close attention to the balance of 
net foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA) and used other means to achieve the target 
growth of broad money. Vo et al (2000), testing the impact of intervention in affecting the monetary 
10 In September 1998, the SBV limited the foreign exchange position of a bank to 30 percent of equity, and imposed 
foreign exchange surrender requirements of up to 80 percent of available balances (Decree 173/QD) in order to 
increase the supply of US dollars. Subsequently, the SBV reduced the requirements to 50 percent in August 1999 and 
then eliminated altogether in May 2003.
11 Decision 85/2000/QD-NHNN14 on “Regulations on Open Market Operations” and Decision 608/2000/QT-SGD on 
“Procedure of Open Market Operations”.
Source: State Bank of Vietnam
Figure 7 . The End-Month Offi  cial Exchange Rate of the Dong against the US Dollar, 1990-1999
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base under the pegged exchange rate regime between 1993Q3 to 1999Q2, found that the offset 
coefficient was negative and ranged between -0.79 to -0.61. It is possible that, lacking the market 
instruments, the SBV was unable to fully offset the effect of intervention on the monetary base. 
　III.3.2.b. 2000-2010
Although the US dollar depreciated against most other currencies (such as the British pound, 
euro, Japanese yen, and Thai baht), the dong slowly moved downwards against the dollar, as the 
government attempted to preserve relative competitiveness in the Asian-Pacifi c region as well as in the 
world. The SBV intervened in the foreign exchange market to achieve the exchange rate target, with 
the depreciation limited to around one percent over this period. Intervention was often substantial, but 
the resulting increase in the balance of net foreign assets was larger than the change in the monetary 
base. Ulrich (2005) thus concluded that the SBV had partially sterilized the effect of foreign market 
interventions.
In order to prevent the dong from appreciating as FDI and FPI infl ows rose, the SBV bought more 
than nine billion US dollars in 2007, while selling Treasury bonds. At the same time, the SBV required 
commercial banks to increase compulsory reserves from 10 percent to 11 percent, and 41 commercial 
banks to buy 20,300 billion dong in 364-day compulsory SBV bills,12 issued on 17 March 2008.13 
Unfortunately, the SBV’s efforts to sterilize the effect of intervention were not entirely successful: 
total liquidity in 2007 increased by 46 percent in 2007 from 2006; high infl ation, accompanied by 
depreciation pressure on the dong and large defi cits in the trade and current account balances. 
Several factors were at play. First, in 2007, the SBV believed that the excess supply of US dollars 
was temporary, and that it would be reversed at the end of the year because of high import demand.14 
12 Compulsory bills are bills that the SBV required 41 commercial banks to purchase at the rate of 7.8 percent (set lower 
than the prevailing market rate) in order to withdraw funds from circulation.
13 See Takagi and Pham (2011) for more details.
14 In Vietnam, a seasonal excess demand for US dollars has been observed for many years towards the end of the year.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
Figure 8 . Annually Changes in Net Foreign Assets and Net Domestic Assets, 1995-1999 (in billions of 
Vietnamese dong)
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As it turned out, large investment inflows continued to come into Vietnam in late 2007 and early 
2008, leading to a rapid growth in the domestic money supply. Second, in 2007, the SBV sold bills 
and bonds to withdraw funds from circulation, but this was not entirely successful, because: (1) the 
SBV’s bills and bonds were not attractive to commercial banks because the interest rate was low and 
the maturities were not diversifi ed; and (2) in late 2007 and early 2008, most commercial banks were 
short of dong funds. Finally, the liquidity injection facilitated a rapid private sector credit growth. 
In view the excess supply of US dollars, the SBV in September 2008 began to purchase dollars to 
prevent the dong from appreciating and attempted to mop up excess liquidity through open market 
operations. In the meantime, the SBV continues to offer SBV bills with varying maturities ranging 
Source: State Bank of Vietnam
Figure 9 . The End-Month Offi  cial Exchange Rate of the Dong against the US Dollar, 2000-2010
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Figure 10 .  Annually Changes in Net Foreign Assets and Net Domestic Assets, 2000-2009 (in billions of 
Vietnamese dong)
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from 28 days to 364 days.
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper has presented a review of the legal framework for and recent developments in foreign 
investments in Vietnam for the period 1990-2010. By looking at the process of liberalizing inward 
FDI, outward FDI as well as foreign portfolio investment flows, the paper has shown that Vietnam 
followed the conventional capital account liberalization process, namely, from direct to portfolio 
investment, and from long-term to short-term. The improvement in the legal environment has attracted 
foreign investors and led to a large inflow of FDI and FPI that contributed to Vietnam’s economic 
development.
The paper has also reviewed Vietnam’s exchange rate policy over the same period, as another pillar 
of the country’s strategy toward the external sector. Exchange rate policy is always closely connected 
with monetary policy, but in the case of Vietnam the connection is particularly intimate. The paper 
has noted that the exchange rate is used as an indirect instrument or even as a target in some cases 
for monetary policy. The dual objectives of exchange rate and price stability assigned to monetary 
policy have from time to time presented the State Bank of Vietnam with a challenge. For example, the 
policy of allowing a moderate depreciation of the dong over time has come in conflict with the need 
to maintain price stability, as a weaker dong created inflationary pressure and rising input prices for 
Vietnam’s industries.
The switch from a fixed peg (to the US dollar) to a managed float in the early 1990s can be 
understood in the context of capital account liberalization, as documented in the text. Given the well-
known “impossible trinity” (i.e., the proposition in the economic literature that governments have 
only a limited ability simultaneously to pursue a stable exchange rate, an open capital account, and 
an independent monetary policy), the policies Vietnam chose to pursue after the beginning of Doi 
Moi in 1986 made it increasingly difficult to maintain a fixed peg as it also tried to maintain monetary 
autonomy. It is also possible that the Vietnamese authorities desired to conserve precious foreign 
exchange reserves as a buffer against adverse external shocks as it continued to open its economy. 
This paper has thus amply demonstrated the close connection between capital account liberalization 
and exchange rate policy for a small developing economy.
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